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Abstract: To date, studies of the effect of politics on markets have generated a 
variety of often conflicting conclusions.  I argue that this conflict originates not from 
the need to refine current analyses but the need to move away from treating asset 
classes – bonds, stocks, and currency markets – as unitary objects of study.  Not 
only do investors choose to invest in different asset classes, they can also choose 
from a variety of investment instruments within each class to diversify risk.  It is just 
this diversification that implies that investors holding different instruments may 
react differently to politics and political news even within the same asset class.  I test 
this argument statistically on Mexican stock market behavior during the 2006 
presidential campaign.  Analysis of stock market performance by economic sector 
reveals different investor responses to shifts in candidate support that not only differ 
by economic sector but also from aggregate stock market trends.   
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Mexico’s July 2006 presidential campaign was of considerable interest to emerging 
market portfolio investors.  Unlike in several other emerging market nations that also held 
elections that year, the Mexican race raised the possibility of a significant economic policy shift 
from the neo-liberal economic policies followed by the formerly hegemonic Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in the 1990s and more recently by outgoing President 
Vicente Fox Quesada of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN).  The incumbent PAN’s right-
leaning candidate Felipe Calderón Hinojosa faced a strong electoral challenge from the popular 
left-leaning former Mayor of Mexico City Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Partido de la 
Revolución Demcrática (PRD).  While Calderón promised to maintain a market-friendly 
economic policy stance, guaranteeing a macro-economic stability to attract foreign direct 
investment, spur job creation, and foster economic growth, López Obrador criticized the 
nation’s neo-liberal economic policy strategy and advocated an increased role of the state in the 
economy and infrastructure investment to reduce poverty and trigger economic growth.   
The importance of Mexican assets in emerging market portfolios amidst the possibility of 
a radical economic policy shift promised to affect expected portfolio returns.  Given López 
Obrador’s anti-neoliberal economic policy rhetoric, it is not surprising that many investors 
expressed negative views about the prospects of López Obrador victory.  These positions are 
reflected in research from investment banks and independent firms serving financial markets.  
In February 2006, for example, Bear Stearns’ Equity Strategy Research Team downgraded 
Mexico from market weight to underweight based on the prospect of a López Obrador victory 
(Bear Stearns 2006).  Yet, evidence also suggests that some investors may have not been as 
worried about the investment risks of a left-leaning presidency.  Credit Suisse expressed 
skepticism that López Obrador could change institutions and policy enough to threaten assets 
(Credit Suisse 2006).  Mexico´s strong fundamentals, such as its improving debt portfolio, low 
  
current account deficit, steady growth rates, and low inflation, moderated concerns associated 
with a López Obrador win (Credit Suisse 2006).   
The contrasting market views about the risks associated with a left-leaning administration 
in Mexico are not that surprising for they also color scholarly research on the impact of politics 
on markets.  While numerous scholars have found that the promise of leftward policy shifts 
raises risks and lowers returns (Block, et al. 2003, Leblang and Mukherjee forthcoming, 
Leblang and Mukherjee 2005, Mauser and Fitzsimmons 1991), others have found that the 
globalization of trade and financial markets restricts the range of policies available to all 
governments, regardless of their ideological preferences, leading to convergence toward neo-
liberal economic policy regimes (Mosley 2003, Obstfeld and Taylor 2004, Simmons 1999, 
Strange 1996, Wibbels 2006).  Policy convergence implies that left-leaning regimes present far 
fewer market risks than one might expect, something that should lighten investor worries about 
the professed economic policies of potential left-leaning administrations.  However, a few 
scholars have also found that the promise of policy shifts in any direction, whether to the left or 
right, are troubling to investors, implying that convergence may not be the norm and that 
political and policy uncertainty of any kind are problematic for investors (Bernhard and 
Leblang 2002, Bernhard and Leblang 2006, Fowler 2006, Jensen and Schmith 2005). 
These conflicting market and scholarly conclusions demonstrate that the debate about the 
investment risks associated with partisan politics and political turnover is far from settled.  
Moreover, they reveal that portfolio investors may not hold uniform, systematic, or even 
predictable views about the effects of politics on markets and it is upon this last observation 
that this study seeks to build.  Rather than focusing primarily on whether investors are more 
concerned about leftward policy shifts or policy uncertainty, this study seeks to explain the 
underlying reasons why market analysts and scholars have found that investors frequently hold 
  
divergent views about the partisan risks associated with investments.  To this end, I build on 
scholarly research demonstrating that investor responses to politics may depend on the type of 
investments they hold and use this observation to argue that differences in investment type is 
what drives underlying market analysts´ and scholars´ conflicting conclusions about the effect 
of politics on markets.   
A few scholars have noted that the risks and rewards associated with holding bonds, 
equities, or foreign exchange often differ even under the same political or policy regime 
(Maxfield 1997, Mosley 2003, Mosley and Singer forthcoming, Santiso 2003).  I take this 
observation one step further to argue that treating bond, stock, and currency markets as unitary 
asset classes may mask important variation in investor concerns about politics within each type 
of investment class.  Government and corporate bond holders can choose different maturities, 
currencies, and payment types.  Corporate bond and stock holders can invest in companies 
located in different economic sectors.  The instruments of foreign exchange investment are 
numerous.  The wide range of investment instruments falling within any asset class implies that 
investors may face distinct market risks under the same political and policy regimes even 
within a single asset class.  Of course, bond, equity, and currency markets in the industrialized 
world include a wide array of investment instruments that politics can affect.  But even the 
relatively less developed markets of emerging market nations are now beginning to rival their 
industrialized counterparts in the depth and diversity of investment instruments, thereby raising 
the chances that politics might affect investment instruments differently within the same asset 
class in these nations as well.   
To evaluate whether and how investors respond to politics by investment instrument, I 
focus on equity assets.  Not only have equity markets been found to provide a good measure of 
investor attitudes toward politics and policy (Herron 2000, McGillivray 2003), equity investors 
  
can choose to hold stocks in a variety of companies located in different economic sectors.  
Despite this, however, there has been a surprising lack of research on the effects of politics on 
equity markets (Mosley and Singer forthcoming).  The lack of research remains true despite the 
importance of equity markets as a source of capital for domestic economic development and as 
a means of portfolio diversification for private investors and even governments (Lavelle 2004, 
Mosley and Singer forthcoming).  In an effort to help contribute to this growing literature, I 
argue that equity investors with assets in economic sectors that benefit from rising domestic 
aggregate demand should respond positively to left-leaning parties promising economic growth 
through fiscal expansion and state involvement in the economy.  In contrast, investors holding 
assets in sectors that depend on macro-economic stability will prefer right-leaning parties 
promising more fiscally austere, market-friendly, neo-liberal economic policies.   
To test the effect of politics on stock prices by economic sector, I analyze equity 
investors’ reactions to election polling trends during the 2006 Mexican presidential campaign.  
Given that the principal distinguishing feature of the top two contenders for the presidency that 
year was their divergent attitudes toward the neo-liberal economic model followed in Mexico 
since the 1990s, equity investors should have reacted differently to the prospects of a left-
leaning López Obrador or right-leaning Calderón victory depending on which area of the 
economy their stock holdings laid.  Investors in domestic-oriented enterprises dependent on 
domestic consumption should have responded favorably to the prospects of a López Obrador 
win as he promised increased state spending, infrastructure investment, and state involvement 
in the economy to trigger economic growth.  Those concentrating on export-oriented industries 
and financial services should have preferred Calderón’s promises to maintain market-friendly 
economic policies and macro-economic stability.   
  
The study proceeds as follows:  First, I outline the current state of the scholarly debate 
about the effect of politics on markets to demonstrate that most scholars treat asset classes as 
unitary, thereby overlooking the range of investment instruments within each class that might 
also respond to politics in different ways.  In the second section, I describe the 2006 Mexican 
election and the principal candidates´ divergent policy promises to show how this race provides 
an ideal testing ground for analyzing whether investors react to politics according to the nature 
of their investments.  I present the argument’s principal testable hypotheses as applied to the 
Mexican case in the third section.  The fourth section discusses the variables and data used to 
evaluate the hypotheses in the fifth section.  I then conclude. 
 
The Argument about Politics and the Variety of Equity Investor Concerns 
Investors have an assortment of investment instruments across a variety of asset classes 
at their disposal in the global market.  Given the range of investment instruments, it should thus 
not be surprising to expect that partisan politics will affect the risks and rewards associated with 
different types of investments in different ways.  Despite this, only a few scholars have studied 
how investors “have different preferences and concerns regarding asset allocation and public 
policies” in a systematic way (Mosley and Singer forthcoming).  One of the earliest scholars to 
study the diversity of investor preferences toward politics and policy and how this is affected 
by the type of investment held was conducted by Maxfield (1997).  In her study of the 
international and domestic forces explaining why middle-income developing countries adopt 
independent monetary institutions, Maxfield (1997) examines how investors in different asset 
classes, including foreign direct investment, international bank loans, foreign bonds, and 
foreign equity shares, respond to changes to the level of central bank independence.  She finds 
that investor responsiveness “varies with four characteristics: asset-specificity, risk structure, 
  
access to local information, and number of investors” (Maxfield 1997, p36).  In his study of 
emerging market investment trends, Santiso (2003) notes that bond holders generally 
disapprove of expansionary fiscal policies as they raise interest rates while stock holders and 
foreign direct investors generally prefer government policies that promote high growth (Santiso 
2003, p.43). 
In demonstrating how investors’ preferences toward partisan politics, political 
institutions, and policy vary according to the type of investment held, most scholars treat 
investments in each asset class as uniform.  Although Santiso (2003, p.43) also notes that even 
within the same asset classes “actors can diverge in their moneymaking strategies and the 
temporal horizons of their investments,” McGillivray (2003) is perhaps the only scholar to date 
to distinguish in a systematic way the diverse effect of politics on investment risks within a 
single asset class.  In her study of stock price trends in industrialized nations, she shows how 
electoral institutions and changing governing coalitions affect investor expectations about 
which industries will be favored or disadvantaged under state industrial and trade policies.  
Moving beyond inter-industry differences in stock market trends, however, it is important to 
note two things.  First, as mentioned, investors in the same asset class can differ dramatically in 
the temporal horizons of their investments, with some favoring short-term strategies and others 
longer-term investments.  Second, and related to the point above, there are a variety of 
investment instruments available within each asset class.  Sovereign bond holders can chose 
bonds with different maturities, currencies, and payment types, each having different risks and 
rewards associated with government economic policy and thus political scenarios.  Investors 
holding company bonds can also choose from a range of maturities and payment types, in 
addition to companies located in different economic sectors.  The instruments for holding and 
trading foreign exchange are numerous, each associated with different risks and rewards 
  
affected by both domestic and global economic and political events.  And, of course, equity 
investors in distinct economic sectors can be affected differently by a range of governmental 
economic and monetary policies, not just by trade and industrial policies alone.  This list does 
not include the variety of more sophisticated investment instruments like futures, options, and 
derivatives, further extending the investment possibilities available to, and thus the political 
risks affecting, investors.   
Following studies like Hibbs (1987), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), Garrett (1998), 
Franzese (2002), and Fowler (2006), I assume that policies supporting macro-economic 
stability and low inflation – policies known to be preferred by right-leaning parties who 
represent middle and upper class constituents - will have different economic and thus 
investment implications than policies supporting redistribution and employment promised by 
left-leaning parties to working class constituents.  I also assume that partisan politics and the 
governmental policies they produce affect diverse sectors of the economy differently (Maxfield 
1997, Mosley and Singer forthcoming, Santiso 2003).  I build on these two observations and 
join them with those made above about the variety of investment instruments available to 
investors to argue that even assets within the same class will be affected by partisan politics and 
policy in different ways, thereby generating different investment risks and investor concerns.  
Investors choosing instruments that benefit from rising domestic aggregate demand should 
respond positively to left-leaning parties and governments promising economic growth through 
expansionary economic policies and state involvement in the economy.  Investors holding 
assets that depend on macro-economic stability will prefer right-leaning parties, neo-liberal 
economic policies, and minimal state interference in markets.  
 
Reasons for Testing the Argument on Stock Market Behavior in Mexico 
  
To test the impact of partisan politics on different investment instruments, I evaluate 
stock market trends among two different economic sectors.  Given that politics and policy 
affect economic sectors differently, analysis of stocks in different economic sectors should 
yield a variety of investor reactions and concerns under governmental policy regimes.  That is, 
investors holding stocks in companies located in economic sectors that benefit from 
expansionary economic policies should react positively to left-leaning parties and 
administrations.  In contrast, companies located in sectors that depend on macro-economic 
stability, low inflation, and minimal state involvement in the economy should favor right-
leaning partisan rule.  I thus mirror the research on industrialized nations by McGillivray 
(2003) but also broaden the focus from trade and industrial policy to an assessment of the 
attitudes of investors toward politics and politicians promising neo-liberal and anti-neo-liberal 
economic development strategies more generally.  In so doing, I adapt my argument to the 
realities of partisan politics and policy debates affecting emerging market nations where many 
policy choices long settled in industrialized countries are still up for political discussion and 
thus radical change with new administrations.  I thus expect investors in emerging market 
nations to be highly responsive to politics and expected policy changes, swiftly shifting 
investments not only among asset classes but within them as well in an effort to minimize 
political and policy risk and maximize returns.  
More specifically, I analyze the equity market effects of shifts in support for candidates 
competing in Mexico´s July 2, 2006 presidential election.  The Mexican presidential race was 
chosen to test the argument for two reasons.  First, the election pitted two main contenders 
supporting diverse economic policy positions on the left-right continuum.  Second, the length 
of the race, the regular availability of polling data throughout it, and the variation in trends in 
candidate support during the campaign meant that investors were faced with a variety of 
  
expectations about who would win and had plenty of time and incentive to adjust their stock 
positions accordingly.  The Mexican election thus reflects the full range of variance on the 
independent variables - partisan policy preferences and shifting expectations about which 
policy would emerge - thereby enabling hypothesis testing about their effects on markets.   
In terms of the diversity of policy preferences, on the left Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
represented the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) and was joined in coalition by the 
Partido del Trabajo (PT) and the Partido Convergencia (Convergencia).  López Obrador 
advocated an increased role of the state in the economy to beef up job creation and increase 
economic opportunities and growth.  López Obrador’s campaign highlighted Mexico’s wide 
income disparities and his principal campaign slogan “Primero los Pobres” or “The Poor First” 
emphasizes this point.  Infrastructure development was seen as a way to generate jobs and 
stimulate the economy (López Obrador 2005).  He claimed that he would reorient and increase 
spending on social programs, education, and infrastructure development, generating the funds 
for such changes through a crack-down on tax evasion by businesses and elites, and fiscal 
austerity and a reduction in redundant governmental spending and waste.  His policies were laid 
out well ahead of the election campaign in the television program “Diálogos por México” 
broadcast on Televisa and in his book (López Obrador 2005, López Obrador 2005).  López 
Obrador rejected structural reforms preferred by investors and was known for complaining 
about the central bank´s (Banco de México) independence and its traditionally tight monetary 
policies and high reserve levels that he said could be used to help foster economic growth. 
On the right, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa represented the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN).  
The PANista Calderón’s platform highlighted the need to maintain macro-economic stability to 
attract foreign investment that would create jobs, assure economic growth, and reduce poverty.  
During the course of the campaign, Calderón reinvented himself as “El President del Empleo” 
  
or “The Employment President.”  Calderón also focused on how improvements in 
governmental transparency, the rule of law and legal system, and public security would help 
attract foreign investment.  Attention to macro-economic stability was used by Calderón to 
distinguish himself from López Obrador who the PAN portrayed as someone who would 
undermine the government’s achievements on this front.  Calderón expressed his support for 
economic reforms in printed materials and in meetings with private investors.  In a document 
sent to leading television broadcaster Televisa, Calderon outlined his support for fiscal, energy, 
labor, social security reform (2005).  He also highlighted the need for targeted social spending 
programs, scholarships to keep children in school, housing programs that provide subsidized 
loans to the lower classes, education spending to improve citizens’ economic prospects. 
López Obrador and Calderón were widely viewed by most pollsters, market analysts, and 
investors as the most likely winners.1  Mexico’s 2006 presidential campaign process lasted just 
over five months, beginning on January 17, with the formal campaigns concluding on June 28, 
and the elections held on July 2.  Between January 17 and the June 23 ban on their public 
dissemination, there were a total of 76 polls released by 16 different private firms or media 
outlets to the public.  Figure 1 shows a subsample of polling data released to the public during 
the campaign.  The race experienced three distinct trends in candidate support, something that 
should have affected investors´ expectations about who would win and thus led to shifts in their 
concerns about their investments.  The left-leaning López Obrador (PRD) began the race 
leading the right-leaning Calderón (PAN).  This trend continued into mid-March when 
Calderón experienced a surge in support.  From mid-May, the election became more 
competitive.  Indeed, during the week of June 23, most polls showed that the race was too close 
to call, with the difference between the two candidates within statistical margins of error.2  On 
  
July 6, IFE announced that Calderón had won.  The final count showed that Calderón won with 
just 35.9% support to López Obrador´s 35.3% votes.   
--Insert Figure 1 about Here-- 
 
The Expected Effects of Politics on Sector-Specific Equity Assets in Mexico 
Mexico’s stock market, known as the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores or BMV, divides the 
companies listed in it into seven categories, including construction (mostly large general and 
housing construction companies and construction materials producers), commerce (mostly 
domestic-oriented commercial enterprises), communications/transportation (mostly 
telecommunications and media), services (mostly financial services), extractive industry 
(mostly export-oriented mining industries), and transformation (industries involved in both 
domestic-oriented and export activities).3   
Given the range of companies and the stated differences in the main presidential 
contender’s economic policy positions, investors in the BMV should have had different but 
predictable responses to changes in the candidates´ electoral expectations, depending on the 
economic sector of their investments.  I expect that those investors with assets in areas that 
benefit from increased state intervention in the economy and expansionary fiscal policies, like 
construction industries, should have responded favorably to the prospects of left-leaning 
policies and administrations, and thus rises in the possibility of a López Obrador victory.  
Those benefiting from macro-economic stability, like financial services, should have favored 
Calderón.  Due to space limitations, I do not include analyses of all sectors here.  Instead, I 
focus on two sectors with the most obvious interests in one candidate over another.  
Specifically, I hypothesize that:  
 
  
H1: Construction sector investors will respond favorably to gains in support for López 
Obrador, leading to rising stock market returns and lower volatility.  
H2: Financial services sector investors will respond favorably to gains in support for 
Calderón, leading to rising stock market returns and lower volatility.  
 
The Variables and Data Used to Test the Argument and Hypotheses 
The principal dependent variables of concern are market reaction in the Mexican stock 
Market or BMV and among its different economic sectors.  To measure the dependent 
variables, I calculate the daily difference in the log of the BMV’s Price and Quotation Index 
(called the Índice de Precios y Cotizaciones or IPC) for all economic sectors together and then 
for the two main economic sectors considered here.4  Mexico’s IPC is “an indicator of the stock 
market evolution, calculated as a function of the price variations of a selection of stocks, known 
as the sample, balanced, weighted and representative of the stocks traded at the BMV.”5  
Bivariate regression of the daily difference in the log of Mexico’s aggregate IPC and the daily 
difference in the log of the Morgan Stanley Capital Index for Mexico (MSCI Mexico)6 
measured in US dollars returns of coefficient of 0.85 and p < 0.033, so changes in these two 
indices are closely related even though the MSCI Mexico controls for domestic inflation trends.  
This relationship is depicted in Figure 2.  Figure 2 also reveals that the Mexican stock market 
underwent considerable variation in returns and periods of volatility during the presidential 
campaign. Though following emerging market trends, the Mexican stock market 
underperformed compared to emerging market nations.     
--Insert Figure 2 about Here-- 
There are four principal independent variables of concern: the chances of a López 
Obrador victory, the level of electoral uncertainty, and the change in level of popularity of the 
  
two leading candidates.  All political variables are all founded on the percent share of expected 
support for the candidates and required that I collect polling data on the expected support for 
López Obrador and Calderón during the entire campaign.  Mexico´s Instituto Federal Electoral 
(IFE) required all public opinion polls, including results, method of analysis, and client paying 
for the poll, conducted during the campaign that were released to the public to be formally filed 
with that institution.7  In the case that IFE´s list was incomplete, I compared all polls reported 
to that institution with those collected by the Asociación Mexicana de Agencias de 
Investigación de Mercado y Opinión Pública (AMAI) and the Consejo de Investigadores de 
Opinión (CIO).8  These sources gave me a total of 76 polls released during the campaign by 16 
different private firms or newspapers with their own polling departments.   
Four issues complicate the use of public opinion data.  Polls were not released on every 
day that markets were open.  Sometimes, several days or even a week passed before new 
polling information was released.  To address this complication, I follow Jensen and Schmith 
(2005) and assume that market actors use all polling data available to them and thus rely on the 
same information for multiple days until they can update this information with new polls.  This 
means that I reproduced the latest polling results for each market day until new information was 
available.  Sometimes more than one poll was released on a specific day, while some polls were 
released on weekends or holidays.  Results for polls released on the same day were averaged.  
Polls released on weekends or holidays were either used for the subsequent market days when 
no new polls existed or averaged with polls released on subsequent market days.  Market actors 
usually consume weekend and Monday information together when they arrive at work.  Pooling 
the data produced 54 separate observations during the five month campaign.   
Using the polling data above, I derive the four measures of political trends analyzed here.  
The first two capture the percent share support expected for López Obrador and Calderón each 
  
campaign day, as described above.  Although relative candidate support provides a key 
indicator of daily changes in who is expected to win, it is possible that investors also consider 
the volatility in each candidate’s support and the time until the elections when considering 
polling data.  I thus calculate a variable that translates the top two contender’s daily polling 
support into the perceived chances of a López Obrador victory.  Freeman, Hays, and Stix 
(2000) calculate a candidate’s probability of victory using Alesina and Roubini’s (Alesina, et 
al. 1997) “Electoral Option” method that transforms a candidate’s vote share into an expected 
probability of winning more than 50% votes.  The formula for the probability of López Obrador 
winning more than 50% of votes cast for him and Calderón (PtAMLO ) at time t is 
PtAMLO = Φ [(VtAMLO + μ4 d – 50) / (σ4 √d)] 
where VtAMLO is López Obrador´s percent share of the vote for him and Calderon at time t, μ4 is 
the sample mean change in this support for López Obrador at time t-3 through t, the four most 
recent days, d is the number of days before the election, σ4 is the standard deviation of changes 
in support for López Obrador at time t-3 through t, and Φ is the cumulative standard normal 
distribution.9  The Electoral Option method takes into account mean changes in support for the 
candidate, the variance in these changes, and the time left until the election. In Mexico, since 
there were several contenders but only two candidates showed any chance of winning the race, 
I calculate the share of support for López Obrador out of that going to him and Calderón, and 
exclude the PRI´s Madrazo and all small party candidates from this equation. 
Prior research has also highlighted how electoral uncertainty affects investment behavior.  
For this reason, I include a variable that measures electoral uncertainty using Freeman, Hays, 
and Stix’s (2000) “Entropy” index.  This index transforms the probability of victory by the top 
two contenders into a measure of the tightness of the race by removing all reference to which 
candidate is ahead.  The maximum level of uncertainty is when both candidates have 50% 
  
support and minimum uncertainty is when the margin is 100%.  The index ranges from 1, 
maximum uncertainty, to 0, minimum uncertainty.  The formula is 
Electoral Uncertainty = 1 – 4[(p – 0.5)2] 
where p is the probability of victory of López Obrador, as described above.   
Currency movements, stock market trends in other emerging market nations, trends in the 
volume of trades made in the BMV, and interest rates also affect Mexican stock values and 
volatility.  The rate of exchange of the Mexican peso to the US dollar can affect the value of 
assets, so I include a measure of the daily percent change in the inter-bank peso-dollar 
exchange rate at closing to capture the affect of peso appreciation on the Mexican stock 
market.10  I also include a measure of changes to Mexico’s inter-bank interest rate as this rate 
picks up movements in Mexican interest rates.11  Volatility in the volume of daily trading in the 
BMV, which can be triggered by Mexico-specific or global economic factors and political 
events, can affect Mexican asset returns and volatility.  Data was thus included on the BMV 
daily trading volume.12  When investors consider future returns on Mexican investments, they 
compare them to other emerging market nations, so I include the Morgan Stanley Capital Index 
for Emerging Market nations (MSCI EM) to control for general emerging market trends.13   
 
Method of Analysis and Statistical Results  
I use a form of time series analysis called the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) method to conduct the statistical analysis.  Financial market data 
suffer from serial correlation, usually do not demonstrate consistent variance across time, and 
suffer from time varying variability (conditional heteroskedasticity).  The GARCH method 
estimates both the conditional mean at time t and conditional variance at time t as a function of 
the conditional mean at time t-1 and conditional variance at time t-1, respectively.  
  
Conveniently, GARCH allows the inclusion of exogenous shocks like polling information that 
might affect the conditional mean and variance.  As long as the models are appropriately 
specified, GARCH should account for serial correlation and all problems associated with it.  
The general conditional mean and conditional variance models I use are 
Mean:  ΔlnP = λ + β1 E+ β2 C + β3 D + βi Oi + εt , where εt = ~N(0,σ2) 
Variance:  σt2 = ω + α ε t-12 + β4 σ2 t-1 + β2 C+ β4 S+ βi Oi 
where λ and ω are constants, εt is the error term at time t whose variance is normally distributed 
around 0, ε t-12 is the ARCH term, and σ2 t-1 is the GARCH term, P = the IPC for all Mexican 
stocks or stocks in specific economic sectors, E = the daily difference in the log of the MSCI 
EM, C = the percent daily difference in the inter-bank peso – dollar exchange rate at closing, D 
= the daily difference in the log of the Mexican inter-bank bank interest rate, S = the daily 
trading volume of the BMV, O = the other variables measuring electoral uncertainty.  I also 
include an AR(1) term in the mean equation to account for serial correlation (not shown in the 
model above).  The ARCH term should be interpreted as information about the effect of 
“volatility (or volatility shocks) from prior periods” on conditional variance and the GARCH 
term as the effect of variance at time t-1 on variance at time t (Bernhard and Leblang 2006).   
Before analyzing the effect of election polling trends on sector-specific stocks, let us first 
examine how all investors in the BMV reacted to changes in electoral support.  Model 1 in 
Table 1 presents a baseline economic model.  Results for changes in mean stock market returns 
are found in the Mean Equation section of the model.  Changes in stock market returns in the 
MSCI EM were positively associated with returns in Mexico’s IPC, with the coefficient for the 
variable MSCI EM nearly significant at p < 0.113.  A one unit increase in the daily difference in 
the natural log of the MSCI EM led to a 0.0013 increase in the daily difference in the natural 
log of the IPC.  In other words, the Mexican IPC reflects 0.13% of the daily change in the 
  
natural log of the Emerging Market MSCI.  Mexican interest rates, called Interest Rate, and 
peso appreciation, called Peso Appreciation, had no effect on stock market returns.  Peso 
appreciation and interest rate changes are only correlated at -2.9%, so the lack of effect of these 
variables on IPC returns is not the result of multicolinearity.  Results for market volatility are 
shown in the Variance Equation portion of Model 1.  In contrast to the Mean Equation, peso 
appreciation had a positive and significant effect on stock market volatility, with p < 0.004.  
The substantive interpretation of the Variance Equation results are not as important as recalling 
that, even after controlling for the effect of volatility at time t-1 and for the effect of volatility 
shocks at time t-1, peso appreciation had a positive and significant effect on volatility.  The 
daily trading volume in the Mexican stock market, called IPC Volume, is negatively associated 
with volatility, with p < 0.000.   
--Insert Table 1 about Here-- 
The AR(1) term in Model 1 was positive and significant at the p < 0.069 level.  The 
ARCH (1,1) term was negative and significant at the p < 0.000 level showing that volatility 
shocks at time t-1 reduced conditional variance.  The GARCH (1,1) term was negative and 
significant, so variance in returns at time t was a negative function of variance at time t-1.  
Ljung-Box tests for the residuals and residuals squared do not allow us to reject the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals, as evidenced by their high p-values, 
demonstrating that the baseline economic model does not suffer from misspecification.  
Residual plots for this model and for all models analyzed in this article show the residuals to be 
very nearly normally distributed.  Residuals also survived tests for skewness though often not 
stricter tests for kurtosis (fat tails).  I assumed a normal distribution for the residuals in all 
models under study here.  Alternative specifications of the residuals, for example using a 
  
Student T distribution which is common in GARCH models to account for major problems of 
kurtosis, did not produce significant results for Student T distribution coefficients.   
Models 2 through 4 in Table 1 analyze the effects of polling information on the Mexican 
stock market.  Model 2 shows the effect of electoral uncertainty, called Entropy, on mean 
returns and volatility for all stocks in the BMV.  Entropy had no effect on stock market returns 
in the mean model, but it did have a positive and significant effect on stock market volatility in 
the Variance Equation as shown by its positive and significant (p < 0.031) coefficient.  Though 
rising uncertainty over who would win the presidential race had no effect on overall market 
returns, it did lead to rising volatility as investors adopted different expectations about future 
stock price trends.  Model 3 shows the stock market effect of rises in the probability of victory 
of López Obrador, measured by the Electoral Option variable.  Increases in the chances of a 
left-leaning presidency had no effect on stock market returns or volatility, with this variable´s 
mean and variance model coefficients insignificant.  In contrast, rises in support for López 
Obrador, the variable AMLO (PRD) in Model 4, while controlling for shifts in Calderón’s 
support (FCH (PAN)), had a negative and significant (p < 0.000) effect on stock market 
volatility but did not affect returns.   
As in Model 1, trends in emerging market stocks (MSCI EM) continued to have a 
positive and significant effect on Mexican stock market returns in Models 2 through 4 in Table 
1. Peso appreciation and interest rates maintained their insignificant effects on mean returns.  
Peso appreciation retained its positive and significant effect on stock market volatility in 
Models 2 through 4, while trading volume produced mixed results across the models.  The 
AR(1) terms in Models 2 through 4 were positive and significant, while the ARCH (1,1) terms 
were negative and significant at the p < 0.000 to p < 0.003 level, demonstrating that volatility 
shocks at time t-1 reduced conditional variance by a small amount. The GARCH (1,1) terms 
  
produced mixed results, with this term significant only in Model 2.  Model 2 performed similar 
to Model 1 in tests for robustness, attesting to its adequate specification.  Although Ljung-Box 
tests on the residuals in Models 3 and 4 survived robustness tests, attesting to these models’ 
adequate Mean Equation specifications, tests of the squared residuals and thus the specification 
tests of the Variance Equation were mixed.  Model 4 nearly survived robustness tests, with p < 
0.098 but Model 3 did not (p < 0.043).  Alternative specifications of Model 3 did not change 
the overall lack of observed effect of the Electoral Option variable on mean returns and 
volatility, so I conclude that, despite mixed robustness test results for this model, the lack of 
effect of the Electoral Option variable in Model 3 reflects true investor preferences.   
The findings reported in Table 1 point to the presence of an investment community 
mostly concerned with political uncertainty and its effects on their ability to distinguish 
between alternative investment strategies.  Had investor’s largely feared (favored) a left-leaning 
leader, changes in the probability of a López Obrador victory would have negatively 
(positively) affected market returns, implying that a Calderón presidency was preferred 
(rejected).  That investors formed a more consensual view about where asset prices would land 
with rising López Obrador support, even if such shifts had little bearing on whether López 
Obrador would ultimately win, could be taken to support the results for the effect of electoral 
uncertainty on volatility.  Any rises in this candidate’s support, controlling for that of Calderón, 
could have been taken by investors as a signal that the margin between the top two contenders 
was growing, given that López Obrador was either ahead of or tied with Calderón for much of 
the race.  The lack of effect of shifts in Calderón’s support on mean returns or volatility could 
be taken to imply that investors maintained, rather than built up or abandoned, their Mexican 
investment strategies during the race regardless of changes in this candidate’s support.   
  
Yet, the findings in Table 1 are also consistent with another story.  Stock market 
indicators aggregate equity investments across economic sectors.  For this reason, measures of 
aggregate stock market returns may not show any overall change when some company stock 
prices rise and others fall.  Such behavior would produce the null statistical findings for the 
effect of politics on stock returns across the Mean Equation models found in Table 1.  
Moreover, aggregate stock market returns can improve, worsen, or remain unchanged while 
experiencing high volatility, low volatility, and no volatility.  Market volatility measures 
capture variance in aggregate market performance and thus indicate the degree of investor 
consensus about the direction of expected future returns, whether positive, neutral, or 
negative.  Increased certainty about the direction of expected future market performance lowers 
asset price volatility while increased uncertainty raises it.  The volatility equation results shown 
here could be consistent with a situation where politics lead some investors to forecast little 
change in future market returns (regardless of the direction of that change) but others to foresee 
larger future changes (again, regardless of the direction of that change).  As argued in this 
article, the nature of the balance of equity assets across the BMV’s various economic sectors 
could thus be the cause of the generally weak effect of politics on market volatility observed in 
Table 1, even to the point of generating null statistical findings.  It is thus important to separate 
investors by the economic sector where their assets lie to study the effect of politics on markets. 
Tables 2 and 3 present the analysis of the BMV by the two economic sectors under study 
here.  Table 2 shows results for the effect of various market and political variables on stock 
prices in Mexico’s construction sector.  As described in Hypothesis 1, given that López 
Obrador promised to raise infrastructure investment, rises in his support should have had a 
positive effect on construction sector stock returns and a negative effect on volatility as 
investors in this sector largely agreed on the positive benefits of a López Obrador presidency 
  
for their investments.  I also expect that electoral uncertainty will lower returns and raise 
market volatility as investors find it harder to plan their investment strategies in this sector, 
with some choosing to give up holdings.  The baseline economic model shown in Model 1 
reveals that the MSCI EM had a positive and significant effect on construction sector stock 
returns, with this coefficient showing p < 0.013.  In contrast to the overall BMV model in Table 
1, rises in the Mexican inter-bank interest rate (Interest Rate) were positively associated with 
stock market returns, with this variable nearly significant (p < 0.115) in the Mean Equation.  In 
the Variance Equation, Peso Appreciation maintained its positive and significant effect while 
daily trading volume showed no effect on construction sector stock volatility.  The AR(1) term 
was positive and significant, while both ARCH (1,1) and GARCH (1,1) terms were not.  Ljung-
Box tests show that the model is adequately specified. 
--Insert Table 2 about Here-- 
Moving to the political variables in Table 2, rises in the probability of a López Obrador 
victory, Electoral Option in Model 3, had no effect on construction sector stock market returns 
but did have a positive effect on the volatility.  This variable was positive and significant (p < 
0.000) in the Variance Equation.  The level of electoral uncertainty (Entropy) in Model 2 and 
the percent share expected support for López Obrador (AMLO (PRD)) and Calderón (FCH 
(PAN)) in Model 4 produced insignificant coefficients.  The AR(1) terms in all political models 
were positive and significant.  The ARCH (1,1) and GARCH (1,1) terms were not significant, 
showing that volatility shocks at time t-1 had no effect on conditional variance and that 
variance at time t-1 was not associated with variance at time t.  Ljung-Box tests for all political 
models show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals, 
signaling that the models are adequately specified. 
  
The positive and significant effect that rising chances of a López Obrador victory had on 
stock market volatility combined with this variable’s lack of effect on construction sector stock 
returns means that investors in the sector expected that returns to their investments would at the 
very least remain stable but that returns for some company stocks would far exceed those of 
others under López Obrador.  Companies listed in Mexico’s construction sector can be divided 
into two groups: those producing construction materials like cement and involved in major 
construction projects – and thus who stand to benefit from any public works construction 
promised by López Obrador - and those companies involved in Mexico’s housing sector - 
which benefited from the federal housing and subsidized loan programs sponsored by outgoing 
President Fox and who expected to continue to prosper from a continuation of these policies of 
under Calderón.  Rises in the chances of a López Obrador victory led investors to reevaluate 
portfolio holdings, with many possibly seeking to shift assets from housing companies to 
materials producers and large construction companies, leading to greater volatility in overall 
construction sector stock market trends but no change in overall returns.  Selling positions in 
some firms to beef up positions in others raises volatility as those seeking to unload positions 
accept lower prices while those buying into other companies accept higher prices.   
The positive Electoral Option results also imply that rises in the chances of a Calderón 
administration lowered volatility but did not affect returns, signaling that rises in this 
candidate’s electoral prospects likely led many investors to hold onto stocks in some firms 
(probably materials producers) while shoring up positions in other firms (probably housing) in 
the same sector.  Holding positions in some firms while beefing up positions in others, 
depending on the balance of firms in the sector overall and the starting point of their stock 
prices, can lead to a reduction in volatility as prices for some companies remain stable and 
prices for others rise to the level enjoyed by those with stable prices.  This interpretation is 
  
corroborated by the null findings for the effect of electoral uncertainty which reveal that 
investors preferred to maintain holdings in the sector and that most construction sector 
investors believed that their positions would not be hurt by either administration, just that they 
could improve their returns by shoring up positions or shifting assets among companies once it 
became clearer who would win.  Had all construction stock market investors favored López 
Obrador, then returns would have risen while volatility declined, as outlined in Hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 1 is thus only partially confirmed in that some investors seemed to prefer López 
Obrador, others Calderón, but with most not expecting to suffer under either administration. 
Table 3 presents results for the analysis of the effect of polling data on Mexico’s services 
sector.  Companies listed in this sector are mostly confined to Mexico´s financial institutions.  
The initial baseline economic model, shown in Model 1, as well as the other models presented 
in this table do not include AR(1) terms as they were insignificant.  It also includes daily 
changes in Mexican inter-bank interest rates in both the Mean and Variance Equations as 
interest rate changes are expected to affect both returns and volatility in the financial sector.  As 
in most of the other models presented above, trends in other emerging market nations (MSCI 
EM) had a positive and significant effect on stock market returns in Mexico’s financial services 
sector (p < 0.056).  The variables Peso Appreciation and Interest Rate had negative and 
significant (p < 0.013 and p < 0.000, respectively) effect on financial services stock market 
volatility but no effect on returns.  The ARCH (1,1) terms was not significant but the GARCH 
(1,1) term was negative and significant. Volatility shocks at time t-1 had no effect on 
conditional variance, while variance at time t-1 was negatively associated with variance at time 
t.  Ljung-Box tests show that the models are adequately specified.   
--Insert Table 5 about Here-- 
  
Moving to the political variables, Table 3’s Model 2 shows results for the effect of 
electoral uncertainty on financial services stocks.  Entropy had a positive and significant (p < 
0.000) effect on stock market volatility but no effect on market returns.  Rises in the probability 
of a López Obrador victory (Electoral Option) had no effect on returns or volatility, as shown 
in Model 2, but daily changes in support for the top two candidates both affected stock market 
volatility as expected in Hypothesis 4.  This hypothesis predicts that voters will respond 
favorably to rises in support for Calderón, implying that they will respond unfavorably to shifts 
in support to López Obrador.  As shown in Model 4, rises in daily support for Calderón reduced 
stock market volatility while rises in support for López Obrador raised it.  The coefficients 
were significant at the p < 0.016 and 0.005 levels, respectively.  This model excluded the 
Interest Rate variable in the Variance Equation as models with it did not converge.  Ljung-Box 
tests for Models 2 through 4 show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation in the residuals, so the models are adequately specified.  The ARCH (1,1) terms in 
Models 2 and 3 were negative and achieved statistical significance but in Model 4 this term did 
not.  All GARCH (1,1) terms in the political models were positive and significant.   
The financial sector results partially confirm Hypothesis 2.  Rises in Calderón´s support 
reduced market volatility, while rises in López Obrador´s support raised it.  However, rises in 
either candidate’s support, not to mention the Electoral Option variable, had no effect on 
market returns.  This implies that investors in financial services were split between a relatively 
larger group of investors favoring Calderón and fearing López Obrador, and a smaller group 
also preferring Calderón but seeing little risk from López Obrador.  Had all investors behaved 
like the larger group, then rises in support for Calderón would have positively affected returns, 
rises in support for López Obrador would have negatively affected returns, and the Electoral 
Option variable would have negatively affected returns.  This conclusion is also supported by 
  
the Entropy variable’s positive and significant effect on volatility but not on returns.  In some 
studies of the effect of politics on markets, electoral uncertainty was enough to raise investor 
concern, even if investors did not fear the ultimate direction of governmental policy.  However, 
in the case of Mexico’s financial services sector, the positive effect of uncertainty on volatility 
(but not on returns) demonstrates that investor concern over electoral uncertainty grew from 
variation in the level of financial sector investor concern over the country’s ultimate policy 
direction.  Some saw uncertainty over whether López Obrador would carry the election as 
presenting little risk to holdings, while others evaluated uncertainty’s and thus López Obrador’s 
risk to investments more negatively.  Had investors shared similar views about the candidates 
and thus about the effect of a tight race on their investments, then returns would have fallen 
with rises in uncertainty. 
The statistical analysis reveals that the stock market effects of expansionary economic 
policies promised by López Obrador did not conform entirely to the expectations outlined in 
Hypothesis 1, even if the results did show that some companies in some sectors did expect to 
benefit from a left-leaning administration.  I expected investors in construction to experience 
rising returns and lower volatility as support for this candidate or his chances of winning rose.  
Instead, the results reveal that only investors in some construction sector firms seemed to have 
expected to benefit from a left-leaning president.  Moreover, those seeking to benefit from 
López Obrador did not necessarily expect to suffer under Calderón.  That not all investors in 
the companies located in these sectors expected to benefit from López Obrador attests to the 
wide range of economic activities in which firms in any economic sector engage and thus to the 
variation in market benefits associated with left-leading rule.  That not all investors expected to 
suffer under Calderón attests to the strong purchasing power of most Mexican citizens expected 
even under a neo-liberal, and thus relatively more fiscally austere, president.  
  
In terms of Hypothesis 2 about the expected benefits of rises in Calderón’s support for 
financial services, the statistical analysis also produced mixed results.  The results revealed that 
some investors were concerned about electoral uncertainty and the effects of a tight race on 
their assets but that not all investors evaluated electoral uncertainty in the same way.  Even so, 
the results did show that investors evaluated and responded immediately to daily changes in 
candidate support mostly according to theoretical expectation.  Although changes in candidate 
support had no effect on returns, rises in Calderón´s support reduced market volatility while 
rises in López Obrador´s support raised it.  These results combined with those for electoral 
uncertainty attest to the variety of responses by investors in this sector to political news.  Only 
some investors felt at risk under a López Obrador presidency, though most favored Calderón.  
 
Concluding Remarks about the Effect of Politics across Investment Instruments  
The original proposition of this article was to unpack the reasons underlying market 
analysts’ and scholar’s divergent findings about the effect of politics on markets.  Some market 
and scholarly researchers have found that investors perceive higher market risks under left-
leaning rule, while others have shown that changes in policy trajectories, regardless of 
direction, and thus political uncertainty raises the risks to investment.  Rather than conducting 
yet another analysis of investor responses to political information, I designed this study to shift 
the point of analytic focus to show that aggregating assets across classes might mask important 
variation in the market risks of politics on different kinds of investments within each class.  
Investors have a variety of investment instruments at their disposal within each asset class, each 
implying different market risks and rewards under changing political scenarios.  
To build this case, I analyzed investor behavior in the Mexican stock market by 
economic sector during Mexico’s 2006 presidential campaign.  Statistical analysis showed that 
  
polling information, and thus partisan politics and policy promises, do not affect equity 
holdings across economic sectors equally.  Investors across Mexico’s different economic 
sectors varied in their level of acceptance of left-leaning candidates, acceptance of right-leaning 
contenders, fears about electoral uncertainty, and sometimes appeared to have no political 
preferences at all.  Not only do the findings demonstrate the important variation in the effect of 
politics across economic sectors, they also show that aggregate analysis of the stock market on 
the whole can mask this important variation.  This raises the possibility that the balance of 
assets within asset classes, rather than any uniform investor preferences, may be driving most 
scholars’ results thus far, regardless of whether they study stock markets, bond markets, or 
currency trades. Rather than supporting the need for more studies of aggregate asset classes, the 
findings here suggest the importance of detailed analysis of asset classes disaggregated by type 
of investment instrument in order to capture the effect of politics on markets.   
The results also demonstrate that variation in investor responses to politics and political 
information may vary not only by economic sector but also by firm.  This means that even 
disaggregating asset classes by type of investment instruments may not go far enough to 
capture the variety of investor concerns and responses to politics and political news.  Indeed, 
that investors have found numerous ways to diversify risk, even within the same asset classes, 
points to the variety of investment interests and thus the degree of susceptibility of investments 
to political risks.  In the case of stock markets, this means more detailed analysis of firm-level, 
in addition to sectoral level, stocks.  Advocating firm-level analysis should not be surprising to 
scholars of the effect of politics on markets.  The number of firm-level fixed-income and equity 
analysts in the financial world attests to the importance of firm-level, rather than sectoral-level, 
analysis for understanding the effect of politics on markets and thus investor concerns and 
behavior.  If all firms in any given sector could be expected to benefit similarly from changing 
  
political and economic contexts, then financial analysts would focus on the sector rather than 
conduct highly detailed firm-specific analysis.  In the case of government or corporate bonds, 
this means disaggregate of bonds only by maturity rates but also by currency denominations 
and other more sophisticated instruments used by investors to diversify risk.  Though research 
on the effect of politics and markets is still in its infant stage, particularly scholarship on 
emerging market nations, sub-asset levels of analysis should provide ample room for future 
research, yielding fruitful and interesting results.  
  
Notes
1 Running third for most of the race, Roberto Madrazo Pintado represented the more centrist 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in coalition by the Partido Verde Ecologísta de 
México (PVEM).  Two other newly formed small parties ran candidates.  The center-right 
Partido Nacional Alianza (PANAL) ran Roberto Campa Cirfrían, while Patricia Mercado 
represented the left-leaning Partido Alternativa Sociodemócrata y Campesina (Alternativa).   
2 The race was so tight that no pollsters conducting exit polls on July 2 released predictions 
who they thought would win.  IFE was also unable to announce the results on July 2. 
3 I exclude the extractive (mining) sector as this sector depends on global trends in 
industrialized nations.  Another group of stocks, labeled “Various” by the BMV includes a 
range of companies but these are omitted from the study.   
4 IPC data from http://www.banxico.org.mx and sector information from www.bmv.com.mx. 
5 From www.bmv.com.mx. 
6 Available at http://www.msci.com.  All data used in the analysis available upon request. 
7 Available at http://www.ife.org.mx.   
8 Available at http://www.opionamexico.org. 
9 Models including four previous days produced similar results. 
10 Available at http://www.banxico.org.mx.   
11 Available at http://www.banxico.org.mx. 
12 Available at http://www.banxico.org.mx. 
13 Available at http://www.msci.com. 
 
  
Table 1: Polling Data and All Economic Sector Stocks in Mexico, January 17 – June 23, 2006 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ 
Mean Model             
MSCI EM 0.0013 0.0008 0.113 0.0026 0.0008 0.001 0.0016 0.0010 0.120 0.0009 0.0004 0.038 
Peso Appreciation -0.1437 0.1125 0.201 0.0113 0.1765 0.949 0.0293 0.3056 0.924 -0.0311 0.2575 0.904 
Interest Rate 0.1549 0.1530 0.311 0.1033 0.1381 0.454 0.1482 0.1552 0.340 0.1513 0.1662 0.363 
Entropy    0.0041 0.0067 0.540       
Electoral Option       -0.0017 0.0038 0.653    
AMLO (PRD)          -0.00002 0.0007 0.981 
FCH (PAN)          0.00017 0.0007 0.822 
AR(1) 0.2490 0.0440 0.000 0.3686 0.0804 0.000 0.2815 0.0963 0.003 0.2937 0.0880 0.001 
Constant -0.0005 0.0006 0.423 -0.0016 0.0024 0.506 0.0006 0.0033 0.846 -0.0056 0.0467 0.905 
Variance Model             
Peso Appreciation 46.821 16.217 0.004 51.972 27.513 0.059 60.171 35.435 0.089 50.331 14.563 0.001 
IPC Volume  -4.34e-06 8.46e-07 0.000 1.34e-06 6.42e-07 0.037 1.65e-06 1.46e-06 0.261 -1.79e-06 1.11e-06 0.105 
Entropy    0.8340 0.3860 0.031       
Electoral Option       0.2461 0.2761 0.373    
AMLO (PRD)          -0.0277 0.0039 0.000 
FCH (PAN)          0.0045 0.0031 0.152 
Constant -7.9870 0.1666 0.000 -9.0099 0.1006 0.000 -8.8579 0.1231 0.000 -7.3782 0.1817 0.000 
ARCH -0.1703 0.0263 0.000 -0.1684 0.4217 0.000 -0.1512 0.0368 0.000 -0.1845 0.0309 0.000 
GARCH 0.2072 0.1036 0.045 0.2803 0.1225 0.022 0.1354 0.2247 0.547 0.1344 0.1428 0.347 
Diagnostics          
LB Q (1), Q, p-val   0.693   0.545   0.914   0.935 
LB Q2 (1) Q, p-val   0.521   0.417   0.043   0.098 
Log Likelihood   324.118   321.560   319.889   330.793 
Observations   113   111   111   113 
Note: Dependent Variable = Daily Difference in the Log of the Mexican Index of Prices and Quotations (IPC) for all sectors; MSCI EM = Daily 
Difference in the Log MSCI EM in US Dollars; AMLO = Andrés Manuel López Obrador; FCH = Felipe Calderón Hinojosa. 
  
Table 2: Polling Data and Construction Sector Stocks in Mexico, January 17 – June 23, 2006 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ 
Mean Model             
MSCI EM 0.0026 0.0010 0.013 0.0028 0.0011 0.011 0.0010 0.0013 0.439 0.0022 0.0011 0.054 
Peso Appreciation 0.0608 0.3252 0.852 0.0303 0.3677 0.934 0.2187 0.3138 0.486 0.0969 0.3486 0.781 
Interest Rate 0.2110 0.1338 0.115 0.1457 0.1342 0.277 0.1454 0.1168 0.213 0.1456 0.1274 0.253 
Entropy    0.0047 0.0070 0.496       
Electoral Option       0.0021 0.0036 0.559    
AMLO (PRD)          -0.0011 0.0010 0.493 
FCH (PAN)          -0.0010 0.0011 0.493 
AR(1) 0.4080 0.1006 0.000 0.3507 0.1091 0.001 0.4392 0.0906 0.000 0.4153 0.1049 0.000 
Constant -0.00008 0.0029 0.979 -0.0014 0.0029 0.626 -0.0011 0.0033 0.735 0.0653 0.0558 0.242 
Variance Model             
Peso Appreciation 73.6281 37.769 0.051 83.277 56.061 0.137 43.7684 2.8930 0.000 75.001 46.526 0.107 
IPC Volume  3.94e-07 7.06e-07 0.577 2.10e-06 4.57e-06 0.646 2.70e-07 8.76e-07 0.758 2.19e-06 3.79e-06 0.565 
Entropy             
Electoral Option       0.4761 0.1154 0.000    
AMLO (PRD)          -0.0870 0.0853 0.308 
FCH (PAN)          -0.0363 0.0836 0.664 
Constant -8.3361 0.3423 0.000 -8.8567 1.1745 0.000 -8.2853 0.2378 0.000 -4.1882 5.3289 0.432 
ARCH -0.1798 0.1271 0.157 -0.1031 0.1299 0.428 -0.0600 0.0782 0.443 -0.0961 0.1141 0.400 
GARCH 0.2563 0.3389 0.449 0.3213 0.4942 0.516 -0.2686 0.2102 0.201 0.1746 0.4212 0.678 
Diagnostics          
LB Q (1), Q, p-val   0.381   0.487   0.269   0.612 
LB Q2 (1) Q, p-val   0.674   0.844   0.886   0.762 
Log Likelihood   309.308   301.703   302.490   307.755 
Observations   113   111   111   113 
Note: Dependent Variable = Daily Difference in the Log of the Mexican Index of Prices and Quotations (IPC) for the construction sector; MSCI EM = Daily 
Difference in the Log MSCI EM in US Dollars; AMLO = Andrés Manuel López Obrador; FCH = Felipe Calderón Hinojosa. 
  
Table 3: Polling Data and Services Sector Stocks in Mexico, January 17 – June 23, 2006 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ Coef. Std. Err. P>│z│ 
Mean Model             
MSCI EM 0.0016 0.0009 0.056 0.0035 0.0007 0.000 0.0033 0.0010 0.001 0.0021 0.0006 0.001 
Peso Appreciation 0.0715 0.3575 0.842 -0.1333 0.2777 0.631 -0.3954 0.3482 0.256 -0.1118 0.2931 0.703 
Interest Rate 0.2223 0.1489 0.135 0.4670 0.1768 0.008 0.3163 0.1829 0.084 0.2432 0.1294 0.060 
Entropy    -0.0011 0.0033 0.745       
Electoral Option       0.0047 0.0034 0.163    
AMLO (PRD)          -0.0003 0.0007 0.651 
FCH (PAN)          0.0003 0.0007 0.659 
Constant -0.0005 0.0014 0.739 -0.0003 0.0013 0.846 -0.0039 0.0026 0.135 0.0030 0.0458 0.949 
Variance Model             
Peso Appreciation -12.686 5.0797 0.013 -52.401 25.165 0.037 -82.406 51.720 0.111 -14.983 21.674 0.489 
Interest Rate -12.714 0.2696 0.000 -57.985 10.684 0.000 -49.832 26.760 0.063    
IPC Volume  -1.39e06 1.15e-06 0.225 0.00001 2.06e-06 0.000 0.00001 8.68e-06 0.187 8.01e-07 9.29e-07 0.419 
Entropy    0.8622 0.4697 0.066       
Electoral Option       -1.298 0.86663 0.134    
AMLO (PRD)          0.0495 0.0177 0.005 
FCH (PAN)          -0.0543 0.0226 0.016 
Constant -7.9291 0.0020 0.000 -11.490 0.45560 0.000 -12.078 1.0023 0.000 -8.4076 0.9157 0.000 
ARCH 0.0989 0.1220 0.418 -0.2149 0.740 0.004 -0.1699 0.0877 0.053 -0.1237 0.0571 0.030 
GARCH -0.5242 0.1998 0.009 0.7907 0.0762 0.000 1.037 0.0741 0.000 -0.0868 0.1840 0.637 
Diagnostics          
LB Q (1), Q, p-val   0.703   0.716      0.613 
LB Q2 (1) Q, p-val   0.456   0.719      0.397 
Log Likelihood   324.672   322.966   320.878   324.456 
Observations   113   111   111   113 
Note: Dependent Variable = Daily Difference in the Log of the Mexican Index of Prices and Quotations (IPC) for the services sector; MSCI EM = Daily Difference in 
the Log MSCI EM in US Dollars; AMLO = Andrés Manuel López Obrador; FCH = Felipe Calderón Hinojosa. 
  
 Figure 1: Polling Trends from Selected Pollsters Publishing in Mexico’s Major Newspapers or Media Outlets for 
Mexico’s Top Three 2006 Presidential Contenders, January 17-June 23 
 
Note: FHC = Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (PAN); RMP = Roberto Madrazo Pintado (PRI); AMLO = Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD).  Mitofsky = Consulta 
Mitofsky, published with Televisa; Demotecia = Demotecnia, published with Milenio; Reforma = Reforma, published with Reforma; Parametría = Patrametría, 













































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Mexico’s Stock Market Index of Prices and Quotations (IPC) Compared to the Morgan Stanley Capital 
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